Buying power and human rights in the supply chain: legal options for socially responsible public procurement of electronic goods by Martin-Ortega, Olga et al.
1 
                                                                 
Buying power and human rights  in the  supply chain: 
legal options for socially responsible public procurement of electronic 
goods   
 
 
Olga Martin-Ortega, Opi Outhwaite and William Rook 
School of Law, University of Greenwich 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Several scandals involving well-known electronics brands  have highlighted the exploitative 
and unsafe conditions under which many workers operate in the industry’s long and complex 
supply chains. As large-scale consumers of electronic goods public buyers potentially hold 
significant leverage over the behaviour of their suppliers through their buying power. 
Consequently, public procurement has the potential to be a significant influence on these 
supply chains and ultimately the human rights of those working in them. This article critically 
assesses legal options for the promotion of social considerations in the supply chain, 
considering in particular the potential of the EU legal regime for public procurement as a tool 
for improving working conditions and human rights in the electronics industry supply chain. 
 
Key words:  
 
Human rights; labour rights, working conditions; supply chain; electronics industry; public 
procurement; due diligence; European Union  
 
 
 
  
2 
 
 
Buying power and human rights  in the  supply chain: 
legal options for socially responsible public procurement of electronic 
goods  
 
Introduction 
 
The electronics industry supply chain is particularly complex, with many companies 
involved in the manufacturing process and most of them far removed from the end user. In 
2010 a number of workers committed suicide in the Foxconn factory in Shenzhen, China, 
allegedly due to the harsh working conditions they were subjected to and hundreds of others 
threatened threaded to do so. 1 The Taiwanese company Foxconn supplies for a number of  
well-known electronics brands. Since then media attention has brought to light numerous other 
examples of worker’s rights abuses and exposed the exploitative and unsafe conditions under 
which many workers in the supply chain operate in the electronics industry supply chain.2 . As 
large-scale consumers of electronic products, public bodies can, through their buying power, 
hold significant leverage over the behaviour of their suppliers. Consequently, public 
procurement has the potential to be a significant influence on these supply chains. However, 
whilst the inclusion of environmental considerations in public procurement is relatively 
advanced, international and European regulation has been more restrictive in terms of social 
procurement and human rights have not been part of this legal regime. The recently adopted 
reforms of the European Union (EU) public procurement regime have, however, opened the 
door further for social considerations to be included in the procurement process.  
 
This article critically assesses legal options for the promotion of human rights  in the 
supply chain, particularly the potential for the EU public procurement regime to be used as a 
tool for improving working conditions in the electronics industry. The article first discusses 
the nature of the electronics supply chain, considering its global reach and the recognised 
problems with working conditions and workers’  rights violations. The second part 
analysiseses EU public procurement law and the extent to which social and supply chain 
considerations are permitted. This section reflects on both the prevailing rules and those that 
have been introduced in the 2014  reforms. Finally, the third section considers options for 
incorporating supply chain issues into the public procurement process. With a focus on 
overcoming existing legal challenges, this section considers how incorporating human rights 
and social criteria relevant to the supply chain might be pursued concentrating on contractual 
relationships and corporate due diligence. 
 
1. The electronics industry supply chain 
 
1.1 The nature of the electronics supply chain 
 
The electronics industry supply chain extends from the extraction of raw materials to 
the manufacture and assembly of products at large factories contracted by global brands. The 
brand or 'lead firm' conceives of the product and initiates its production as well as carrying the 
product branding. In the electronics industry these firms are very high-value enterprises. Given 
that hardware producers are noted as seven out of the top ten most valuable brands in the world 
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and, additionally, Apple Inc. has been named the world’s most valuable company, 3 electronic 
goods are the tangible and very visible output of a supply chain that generates significant 
profits for those firms.4  
     
In common with other sectors operating in international markets the production of 
electronic goods often takes place in the context of a multi-level global supply chain.5  A single 
product may contain work carried out by several companies in multiple countries and global 
sourcing and relocation of factories is common.6  The lead firm frequently carries out little or 
no manufacturing or production itself and contracted suppliers (or 'contract manufacturers') are 
instead used by the brand. These suppliers may be large enterprises with many employees and 
multiple locations such as FoxxConn, Flextronics and Inventec. These companies assemble 
the products and may purchase components and assemble parts of the final product (such as 
circuit boards). The OECD reports that these companies are often large companies with 
operations in different countries, but have limited market power and are less likely (than the 
lead firms) to be based in developed countries.7  
 
The contracted suppliers may carry out manufacturing themselves but they may, 
alternatively, work with subcontractors who manufacture specific components that form part 
of the final product.8 The factories that produce the components and finished electronic goods 
often employ vast numbers of people to work on their production lines. A significant 
proportion of this manufacturing takes place in China and East Asia.9  China is the largest 
producer of electronics goods worldwide, employing an estimated 7.6 million people in the 
industry but electronics factories are also present in many other (mostly low-income) 
jurisdictions, including Taiwan, Mexico, Malaysia, and the Philippines.10   
 
Beyond manufacturing, there are a great many human rights considerations that affect 
other parts of the electronics supply chain, such as in the extraction, trade, processing,  
transportation of raw materials and recycling and waste management. This article focuses on 
the levels of the supply chain where products and components are manufactured and assembled 
and not on other stages. Similarly, while many issues in the broad field of human rights can be 
discussed in relation to global production systems, this article focuses specifically on the labour 
rights of workers in the supply chains.  
 
1.2 Labour rights and working conditions  
 
A number of difficulties with governance of global supply chains in general have been 
recognised.  The lead firm is typically not in a contractual relationship with the employees of 
its suppliers or with subcontractors nor in turn do those suppliers assume equivalent 
responsibilities in relation to their own subcontractors.  Consequently, where there is a failure 
to adhere to particular standards or to respect employees’ rights, the failure has been the 
responsibility of the employer in that specific part of the supply chain, rather than the 
responsibility of the brand which commercialises the product.  
 
In tandem with this separation of obligations and responsibilities along the supply 
chain, the industry–, having a global market with a reported worth upwards of USD $3.2 
trillion–,11 is under significant consumer and investor pressure to innovate and to reduce the 
lead-times to bring new products to market. These demands create pressure on contracted 
suppliers to increase productivity and reduce costs. At the manufacturing level this has led to 
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concerns about conditions for employees including inadequate working conditions and human 
rights violations.12  In recent times the manufacture of electronic goods has been subject to 
widespread media coverage highlighting poor working conditions in the supply chain and in 
extreme cases suicide of factory workers. 13   Problems sometimes relate to a lack of 
enforcement with national laws but in other instances laws may be inadequate or absent. 
Further, some countries in which manufacturing takes place may not have signed core 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions.14   
 
Reports into working conditions in the electronics industry supply chain consistently 
exposed deficiencies in the protection of workers’ rights. Pressure to get products to market in 
a short time frame has been associated with the use of flexible labour.15  Reports highlight the 
use of contracted labour, which limits job security and often prevents employees from accruing 
benefits that would be available through permanent employment as well as preventing 
opportunities for advancement. 16  Employment of student workers or employees on a 
probationary basis can also prevent employees benefiting from conditions and wages that 
would be available to permanent employees.17 Staff turnover may be high in factories, again 
preventing workers from deriving employment benefits.18 The use of migrant labour has also 
been as identified as a problem;19 these employees can be more vulnerable to the demands of 
employers and more willing to tolerate exploitative practices.20 Again they may be subject to 
precarious terms of employment and those commuting long distances have been found to live 
in poor quality, overcrowded accommodation in order to reduce their own expenditure.21 For 
'local' workers accommodation can also be a problem, with similarly inadequate standards and 
overcrowding being reported in employee dormitories.22  
 
Conditions in the factories themselves may also be poor. Strict rules for employees are 
reported - for instance, with inadequate time for rest or meal breaks - together with punitive 
sanctions for breaches of these rules. 23  Health and safety is also an identified problem, 
including exposure to hazards, especially chemicals, along with other health problems among 
employees.24 For employees of all types wages may be inadequate and can be less than a living 
wage.25 Routine overtime and excessive working hours may be used both by employees as a 
means of making wages reach an adequate level and by employers to ensure that lead times 
are met. Forced overtime has been reported.26  For contract workers, deductions by agencies 
further reduce these wages.27  Discriminatory practices are a further area of concern. In some 
instances women have been favoured as employees because they attract lower wages, in others 
discrimination has been identified against pregnant women.28  Attempts to assert employment 
rights or improve conditions are difficult where there are barriers to association and 
representation or because participation in strikes or other action lead to punitive action from 
the employer.29   
 
Although demand for electronic goods continues to grow,30 concern about the human 
rights of workers in the electronics supply chain is also growing. The increasing profile of 
these concerns along with additional pressure on corporations to recognise responsibilities 
throughout their supply chain31 point to a need for new and more effective responses to 
managing the electronics industry supply chain. In the electronics industry however 
consideration of labour and social criteria is reported to have emerged only recently. Sony, for 
instance, is identified as having published environmental reports since 1994 but it is only as of 
2000 that some electronics companies have been looking at working conditions in their supply 
chains.32 Some industry initiatives have also emerged. The Electronic Industry Citizenship 
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Coalition Code of Conduct (EICC Code) comprises members from the electronics industry 
who are encouraged to adopt and implement the Code.33 The EICC currently lists 84 members 
including many major brands and suppliers.34 The Code of Conduct 'provides guidance on five 
critical areas of CSR [corporate social responsibility]  performance': Environment, Ethics, 
Health and Safety, Labour, Management System [sic] and is monitored through an auditing 
process.35 The Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI) focuses on 'achieving integrated social 
and environmental sustainability through ICT [Information and Communications Technology]' 
and includes a programme to raise labour and environmental standards in the supply chain, 
from primary production (mineral extraction) to manufacture (i.e. of components). In 
collaboration with the EICC, GeSI develops common tools that aim to improve standards as 
well as reducing the resource burden and other barriers for companies seeking to raise 
standards in their supply chain. 36  In 2014 a new independent monitoring organisation, 
Electronics Watch, was launched. Electronics Watch works specifically with public buyers to 
support their efforts for socially responsible public procurement of electronics goods. 37 
Despite these initiatives, reports by labour organisations have continued to identify the 
presence of conditions contrary to the asserted aims of these initiatives and limited knowledge, 
if any, of the existence of codes of conduct by employees.38  
 
2. Public Procurement as a tool for promoting human rights  
 
2.1 The potential for public procurement to influence workers’ rights  in the electronics 
supply chain 
 
Public procurement offers a potentially valuable contribution to the search for 
strategies to improve workers’ rights and working conditions in the electronics supply chain 
and stands out as means of creating market demand for responsibly manufactured goods. 
Certainly, more enlightened corporate social responsibility policies from international brands, 
greater legal protection for workers’ rights in producing countries, and increased advocacy and 
civil society pressure are all powerful tools in this pursuit, but crucially public procurers are 
consumers of electronics goods, and their purchasing requirements are a significant influence 
on corporate profits and therefore a good incentive for companies to address workers’ rights 
issues in their supply chain. As Howe notes, public procurement can simply provide sufficient 
economic leverage to overcome corporate resistance to act.39  At the same time, it can act as a 
regulatory tool both to increase compliance with existing labour laws and to overcome 
questions about the desirability and effectiveness of non-governmental regulation and 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a strategy for improving working conditions in the 
absence of state regulation. 40 This section explores the conceptual possibilities for public 
procurement as a tool to address workers’ rights  in the electronics supply chain and then the 
practical scope to do so within the framework of EU rules. 
 
Public procurement contracts worldwide are estimated to be worth one-thousand-
billion euros annually.41  Governments in OECD member states spend on average 12% of their 
GDP on public procurement,42 rising to an average of 16% in the European Union (EU).43  
Electronic goods comprise a significant portion of public purchases, are often high value items 
and are procured in high volumes. 44   Given the buying power associated with public 
procurement contracts they also hold the potential for significant leverage in social and 
sustainability issues.45 A procurement regime in this context may be used to pursue so called 
horizontal or secondary policies related to social, including human rights or environmental 
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aims. Here public procurement regulation represents a powerful legal instrument available to 
contracting authorities to ensure compliance with secondary or non-commercial goals.46   
 
Socially responsible procurement is not itself a completely new proposition but the 
extent of its application remains limited. 47  The pursuit of environmental objectives is 
comparatively well established and has seen relatively rapid development. The use of 
procurement to achieve human rights and social aims is less well established but it appears 
that, within the framework of the welfare state, governments since the 19th century have 
incorporated horizontal policies linked with domestic employment policies such as promoting 
local employment and manufacturing, stipulating that suppliers to public authorities meet 
equality and diversity criteria, and requiring payment of wages at established levels.48 It is only 
recently however that the potential for public procurement to be applied to promote human 
rights, and in particular workers’ rights  in the global supply chain is being explored.  
 
The Sweatfree Purchasing Consortium is a  leading example of innovation with respect 
to the possible positive impacts of public procurement.49 Established in 2010 the Consortium 
acts as membership organisation for US public entities to assist them to implement sweatshop-
free purchasing practices.50 The initiative is based upon recognition of the economic influence 
of public procurement as a means of influencing working conditions in the supply chain. The 
focus to date has been on the apparel industry but may over time extend to other products. .51 
The model established  by the Consortium is based on the member public entities developing 
a sweatfree procurement policy, including a code of conduct to be used at all stages of the 
procurement process, i.e the evaluation and post award stages.  . The Consortium guides public 
buyers on the content of this code, which should include requirements that their suppliers 
comply with all national and regional legal requirements in the areas where they operate as 
well as with the core ILO Conventions. Furthermore, it suggests public buyers to consider 
setting standards for wages beyond the legally required minimum wage in the country of 
production, such as the provision of ‘“an adequate living wage.’” The model also calls for 
independent monitoring of the supply chain. The expectation is that contractors should know 
and disclose the location of factories in their supply chains and should know and report on the 
extent of compliance with the buyer code of conduct. Member entities may require contractors 
to state that they and their subcontractors have the capacity to comply with the code of conduct 
through a declaration of compliance. With respect to enforcement, buyers are expected to 
recognise that suppliers cannot realistically certify compliance for operators along the supply 
chain and that non-compliance in the supply chain is common. An approach based on 
procedural requirements and having the right processes in place is therefore considered to be 
more effective than simply requiring immediate compliance. The Consortium model also 
provides for complaints to be made by workers to an independent monitor and for collaborative 
action between the parties to be taken to respond to violations. Although currently limited to a 
small number of states and cities,52 this approach clearly acts on the possibility for public 
procurement to be used as tool to address human rights issues in the supply chain. 
 
The Sweatfree Purchasing Consortium notwithstanding, the use of public procurement 
in pursuit of social goals, is underdeveloped. Contributing to this has been an emphasis on 
'value for money', narrowly defined, and the aim of promoting free trade and competition. 
Further, the use of procurement to promote labour standards extraterritorially, this is in 
jurisdictions beyond those of the public buyer raises questions of legal compatibility, 
legitimacy and sovereignty.53  
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To understand how social criteria, and particularly workers’ rights and supply chain 
considerations might be included within the process of public procurement, it is necessary to 
consider the public procurement process in more detail. Once the public buyer has determined 
the goods to be procured they are obliged to establish the criteria on which tenders will be 
compared and evaluated and then the conditions under which the contract must be performed. 
These are the three key stages of the tender process. First, technical specifications are used to 
define the subject matter of the contract. 54  Technical specifications are the required 
characteristics of the product or service tendered for and should be specified in the tender 
documents. Second, award criteria are used to determine the basis on which contracts are 
awarded, and again, should be made public before the contract has been awarded. They allow 
the public buyer to make comparisons between tenders and can be weighted, with points 
awarded based on the ability of the tenderer to meet each of the specified criteria. Finally, 
contract performance conditions can be used to establish conditions that must be performed by 
the successful bidder once the contract has been awarded. They should also be specified in the 
tender documents. Whilst conceptually these stages all allow for the incorporation of social 
considerations, in practice the overarching objectives and the detailed provisions of public 
procurement regulation in the EU mean that incorporation of social criteria into the public 
procurement process is restricted as will be explained in detail in the following section. 
Environmental and social policies have been on the EU agenda for over two decades55 but 
while EU public procurement rules have expressly permitted environmental requirements to 
be considered in different stages of the public procurement process, the same scope and legal 
certainty has not existed for social considerations.56  
 
 
2.2 The EU Framework for public procurement 
 
The underpinning purpose of public procurement regulation is to establish a fair 
system for providing goods and services to public authorities through the application of rules 
on transparency, non-discrimination, and fair competition. The main thrust of the international 
legal regime applicable to the procurement of goods and services by public bodies is to open 
up this potential market through the application of rules on transparency and competition. As 
a signatory of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the EU and its member states have to 
comply with the Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).57 The GPA, like 
other WTO Agreements, aims to increase international trade and eliminate or reduce 
discriminatory trade rules and the protection of national markets. The GPA encompasses key 
principles of the wider WTO framework including national treatment and non-discrimination. 
This, broadly, means that national rules should not treat foreign goods or services (here 
concerning procurement) less favourably than those produced domestically and that goods or 
services cannot be discriminated against based on the country of ownership, production or 
origin. 58  Consequently, parties to the GPA cannot discriminate in favour of domestic 
producers/suppliers and any detailed rules adopted should not usually provide an advantage to 
given countries, or the domestic market. 
 
In the framework of the EU, all public sector authorities, whatever the procurement, 
are subject to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), most significantly 
in relation to rules on equal treatment, freedom of establishment, and freedom to provide 
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services. This means that at the very least contracting entities must act transparently and must 
treat all bidding parties equally, proportionately, and without discrimination.  
 
The legal framework for public procurement had remained unmodified for a decade, 
with the main instruments being the Public Sector Directive (2004/18) and the Utilities 
Directive (2004/17). 59  A revised legislative package for modernisation of EU public 
procurement was approved by the European Parliament on 15 January 2014 and adopted by 
the Council on 11 February 2014.  The new Directives came into force in April 2014 and must 
be implemented by member states within two years of that date. The reformed public 
procurement Directive (2014/24/EU)60 aims to modernise public procurement rules including 
through simplification and increased flexibility, improved market access and a reduction in the 
'missed opportunities for society' including through additional provisions for social 
objectives.61  For the purposes of this article the Directive can be seen as developing the 
procurement framework rather than introducing radical changes. 
 
EU legislation only applies to public contracts above the specified economic 
threshold 62  therefore national legislators are free to regulate public procedures for lower 
amounts in different ways to those specified in the Directives, as long as they comply with 
TFEU provisions.63 Two basic principles apply to public procurement in the context of the EU: 
(i) obtaining value for money and (ii) acting fairly within European and national legislation.64 
‘Value for money’ is described as implying that contracting authorities have an obligation to 
safeguard taxpayers’ interests by procuring goods and services in the most cost-effective way. 
Best value for money is not purely price sensitive, but rather it is price sensitive within the 
defined parameters of the goods or services required, which take into account factors such as 
quality, efficiency, effectiveness, and fitness for purpose, but may also include other factors, 
including environmental considerations.65   ‘Acting fairly’ means applying the principles of 
the internal market established in the TFEU and the Procurement Directives. Respecting the 
principles of non-discrimination, equal treatment, transparency and proportionality, 
contracting authorities must ensure equal access to the contract by operators from all EU 
countries and from countries with equivalent rights; not treat comparable situations differently 
and different situations in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified; 
advertise tender opportunities widely enough to ensure competition and proceed with 
transparency during the procurement decision-making process to preclude any risk of 
favouritism or arbitrariness, informing unsuccessful tenderers of the reasons for rejecting their 
tenders; and finally adopting measures in the procurement process that are appropriate to the 
objectives pursued and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them.66   
 
These principles clearly restrict, in overall terms the considerations, with respect to 
'horizontal policies' that can form part of the procurement process. The new Directive purports 
to enable better integration of social and environmental considerations into public procurement 
procedures. This is reflected throughout the preamble in which reference to the importance of 
integration of environmental, social and labour requirements into public procurement 
procedures is made (Recital 37), recognition is given to the potential use of labelling for works, 
supplies or services conforming with specific environmental, social or other characteristics 
(Recital 75) and the potential to incorporate social and environmental considerations into 
various stages of the procurement process and to ensure that international agreements and 
standards are respected (Recitals 97-105). These reforms respond to calls for fair trade and 
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sustainability to take a more central role in the EU economy and to advances by the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union.67  
 
2.2.1 Technical Specifications 
 
The process of defining the technical specifications would, in principle, be the first 
opportunity to incorporate supply chain considerations into the procurement contract. 68. The 
characteristics of a product or service that must be identified within the procurement 
documents as technical specifications have remained largely the same in the new Directive. 
The technical specifications that are expressly permitted include: quality levels, environmental 
performance level, design for all requirements (including accessibility of disabled people) and 
conformity assessment performance, use of the product, safety or dimensions (including 
requirements relevant to the product as regards the name under which the product is sold), 
terminology, symbols, testing and test methods, packaging, marking and labelling, user 
instructions, production processes,  conformity assessment procedures and climate change 
performance.69 These criteria could be formulated on their own or by reference to specific, 
national, European or international standards approved by a recognised standardising body. 
The definition of technical specifications does not explicitly recognise general social criteria 
nor does it make reference to minimum labour standards or other considerations relevant to 
the supply chain. Only a limited reference to social considerations is included, establishing that 
whenever possible technical specifications should be defined so as to take into account 
accessibility criteria for people with disability or design for all users.  
 
The new rules appear to widen the potential use of technical specifications: under 
Article 42 technical specifications may refer to ‘the specific process or method of production 
or provision of the requested works, supplies or services or to a specific process for another 
stage of its life cycle even where such factors do not form part of their material substance 
provided that they are linked to the subject-matter of the contract and proportionate to its value 
and its objectives' [emphasis added]. This requirement that technical specifications are 
restricted to the subject-matter of the contract presents however the main obstacle to including 
social considerations, and in particular those relating to the protection of workers’ rights  in 
the supply chain. Article 42(4) specifically excludes the possibility of referring to given 
production methods or processes as part of the technical specification unless it is ‘justified by 
the subject-matter of the contract’. The term ‘subject-matter’ is not defined in Directive 
2014/24, nor was it in the 2004 Directive, but this requirement clearly limits the availability of 
technical specifications to be used as a tool for promotion of human rights and other social 
considerations. The conditions of workers in the supply chain  might not therefore be allowed 
to be included as part of the technical specifications of a product, even if it might be considered 
as part of the production process, because it does not appear to directly relate to the subject-
matter of the contract.70   
 
Technical specifications can also be defined by reference to the use of labels. Whilst 
Directive 2004 restricted these to eco-labels, the new Directive opens this use wider, to include 
the use of social labels (Art. 43(1)).71  Art 43(2) refers to the situation where a label meets the 
requirements of Art 43(1) but also sets out further requirements, which are not linked to the 
subject-matter of the contract. In this case only the parts of the label that are linked ‘to the 
subject-matter of the contract and are appropriate to define characteristics of this subject-
matter’ may be included in the technical specification. The way that components are produced 
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or the rights and working conditions of those producing them  are unlikely to meet this subject-
matter requirement. The potential to include in the specification social labels referring to 
production processes and human rights standards further along the supply chain therefore 
appears to be excluded.72  
 
In conclusion, although a general reference to the inclusion of social considerations is 
made in the new Directive, its application will be limited in practice given the restrictions 
discussed above. The inclusion of references to the production process and life-cycle of a 
product could have been an opportunity to include social considerations as part of the technical 
specifications, in particular the respect of labour rights and the consideration of working 
conditions in the supply chain, but this possibility is restrained by the need for technical 
specifications to relate to the subject matter of the contract. 
 
2.2.2 Award Criteria 
 
Award criteria are used to determine the basis on which contracts are awarded. Award 
criteria can be weighted, with points allocated based on the ability of the tenderer to meet each 
of the specified criteria. The procurement documents must specify each criteria and their 
weighting. The 2004 Directive limited the criteria under which contracting authorities could 
base the award of public contracts to either: (a) the most economically advantageous tender 
(from the point of view of the contracting authority) or, (b) the lowest price.73 The criteria to 
determine the most economically advantageous tender had to be linked to the subject matter 
of the public contract, and included, quality, price, technical merit, aesthetic and functional 
characteristics, running costs, cost-effectiveness, after-sales and technical assistance, delivery 
date and delivery period or periods of completion. Therefore under that regime the production 
process and considerations of working conditions during the manufacturing of the product 
were not elements to consider when establishing the most economically advantageous bid in 
awarding the contract.  
 
The new Directive initially appears to take a less restrictive approach. Recital 97 in 
particular provides for broader use of award criteria (or contract performance conditions) 'with 
a view to the better integration of social and environmental considerations in the procurement 
procedures'. Recital 97 refers to the use of award criteria in respect of ‘any stage in the life 
cycle’ of the product (this might, for instance, include its manufacture), and including 'factors 
involved in the specific process of production [...] even where such factors do not form part of 
their material substance’ (for instance manufacturing conditions). Nevertheless, the condition 
of a link with the subject matter of the contract remains.74  It correlates therefore that Recital 
97 confirms that a general CSR requirement should not be attempted within the scope of the 
subject matter requirement, stipulating that:  'the condition of a link with the subject-matter of 
the contract excludes criteria and conditions relating to general corporate policy, which cannot 
be considered as a factor characterising the specific process of production or provision of the 
purchased works, supplies or services. Contracting authorities should hence not be allowed to 
require tenderers to have a certain corporate social or environmental responsibility policy in 
place.' Further, Recital 98 makes it clear that any social aspects of the production process to 
be included must relate to the goods that are to be provided under the contract.  
 
More specific references to working conditions are made under Recital 99 although 
these appear to emphasise internal (member state) employment policies, specifically ‘measures 
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aiming at the protection of health of staff involved in the production process’ and the 
‘favouring of social integration of disadvantaged persons’. Relevant criteria are suggested as, 
for example, 'the employment of long-term job-seekers, the implementation of training 
measures for the unemployed or young persons in the course of the performance of the contract 
to be awarded.' The reference to the health of the persons involved in the production process 
is directly relevant when questioning whether contracting authorities could include workers’ 
rights and working conditions in the supply chain as part of the award criteria, as long as a 
connection could be made to long working hours, unhealthy and unsafe working environments, 
restriction of rest time, etc., to the health of the workers (directly involved in the production 
process). In this respect then, pertaining to the preamble, the Directive 2014/24 provides more 
opportunities for incorporating human rights and social criteria into the award phase. 
 
In the new Directive, contracts are to be awarded simply to the most economically 
advantageous tender (and not on the basis of ‘lowest price’ as in the 2004 Directive). Article 
67 sets out specific rules concerning award criteria. This provision provides that the most 
economically advantageous tender, from the point of view of the contracting authority, shall 
be identified on the basis of the price (or cost) using a cost-effectiveness approach and may 
include the best price-quality ratio 'which shall be assessed on the basis of criteria, including 
qualitative, environmental and/or social aspects, linked to the subject-matter of the public 
contract in question'. Again, subject-matter is not defined, but Article 67(3) provides that 
'[a]ward criteria shall be considered to be linked to the subject-matter of the public contract 
where they relate to the works, supplies or services to be provided under that contract in any 
respect and at any stage of their life cycle' including factors involved in the process of 
production or a specific process for another stage of their life cycle, even where such factors 
do not form part of their material substance. The potentially wide scope of the life cycle 
provision is therefore again restricted by the subject matter requirement. There may be greater 
scope to explore this in the award criteria phase because of the possibility of establishing a link 
between the life-cycle of the product and the subject-matter when determining cost-
effectiveness. However this would require that social criteria including respect for the rights 
of workers in the supply chain  could be read into the meaning of subject-matter and that this 
could be factored into an assessment of the price-quality ratio in order to determine the most 
economically advantageous tender. 
 
One of the rationales of the new Directive is to allow for strategic use of public 
procurement in response to new challenges. Among these are sanctioning violations of 
mandatory social, labour or environmental law as recognised in Recital 37.75  Recital 103 
further states that rejection of abnormally low tenders should be mandatory where the 
contracting authority has established that the reason for the low price is because of non-
compliance with EU or compatible national law in the fields of social, labour or environmental 
law. Article 69(3) confirms that 'contracting authorities shall reject the tender, where they have 
established that the tender is abnormally low because it does not comply with applicable 
obligations referred to in Article 18(2). These measures make significant reference to the 
importance of compliance with international and other law (albeit that relevant mandatory laws 
may not apply to some supply chain problems or in certain locations). However, the 
requirement that the authority establish that the tender is low because of this restricts their 
practical impact particularly where global supply chains are in question: the authority may 
have limited if any knowledge of the details of the supply chain much less the resources to 
satisfy this threshold. 
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Overall, the new Directive does appear to open the door to inclusion of  social 
considerations including human rights in award criteria but the general lack of references to 
the supply chain and the scope of social criteria is at the same time limiting. This means that it 
is likely that further guidance from the European Court of Justice will be needed to establish 
the parameters of these measures. The removal of references to lowest price as the basis for 
awarding the contract and the more widely defined terms for economically advantageous may 
help to shift the emphasis of the procurement process from a strictly 'bottom line' approach. 
The reference to subject-matter (and failure to adequately define that term) is again a limitation 
but in the context of award criteria - as compared with technical specifications - there appears 
to be greater scope to incorporate measures pertaining to the life cycle of the product, widely 
construed. 
 
2.2.3 Contract Performance Conditions 
 
Contracting authorities have been much freer to impose environmental and social 
considerations when negotiating conditions governing how the contract with the tenderer must 
be performed in comparison with the other phases of procurement.  Since contract performance 
conditions apply after the contract has been awarded they do not impact the assessment of 
tenders and therefore are less likely to cause problems related to the principles of equal 
treatment and non-discrimination. 
Directive 2004/18 provided that social considerations were allowed in contract 
performance conditions as long as they were not directly or indirectly discriminatory and were 
indicated in the contract notice.76  In its Preamble the Directive specifically listed conditions 
intended to favour onsite vocational training, the employment of people experiencing 
particular difficulty in achieving integration, the fight against unemployment or the protection 
of the environment. Overall, the 2004 Directive was restricted to domestic social 
considerations and specific reference to social considerations in the Preamble was not 
replicated in the Articles of the Directive.77   
 
Directive 2014/24 goes further in incorporating social considerations. The references 
to social criteria in Recitals 97-99, discussed above, also apply to contract performance 
conditions. Contract performance conditions are permitted under Article 70 where related to 
the subject-matter of the contract within the broader meaning established in Art 67(3).78 Article 
70 expressly states that those conditions may include ‘economic, innovation-related, 
environmental, social or employment-related considerations'. Thus a wider and apparently 
more permissive rule than those applicable at earlier stages of the procurement process applies 
here. 
 
Specifically relevant to the supply chain challenges are the use of subcontractors. 
Directive 2014/24 directly addresses such  use. The 2004 Directive had provided that the 
contracting authority may ask or be required by a member state to ask the tenderer to indicate 
any share of the contract he may intend to subcontract. Maintaining this provision Directive 
2014/24 (in Art 71(2)), it also provides in Art 71(1): 'observance of the obligations referred to 
in Article 18(2) by subcontractors is ensured through appropriate action by the competent 
national authorities acting within the scope of their responsibility and remit.'  Art 18(2) 
establishes as a principle of procurement the position that member states shall take appropriate 
steps to ensure that in the performance of public contracts, economic operators comply with 
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applicable obligations of social, environmental and labour law including those specified in 
Annex X which includes the core International Labour Organisation Conventions such as those 
addressing freedom of association, right to organise and collective bargaining; forced and child 
labour, discrimination and equal pay.79 Further, Art 71(6) provides: with the aim of avoiding 
breaches of Art 18(2), (a) 'where the national law of a member state provides for a mechanism 
of joint liability between subcontractors and the main contractor, the member state concerned 
shall ensure that the relevant rules are applied in compliance with the conditions set out in 
Article 18(2)' and (b) the contracting authorities may required to confirm whether there are 
grounds for exclusion of subcontractors pursuant to Art 57. In this case the economic operator 
may be required to replace the subcontractor. The question of subcontractors is also referred 
to in the preamble, which recognised that ‘[it] is important that observance by subcontractors 
of applicable obligations in the fields of environmental, social and labour law [...]  be ensured 
through appropriate actions by the competent national authorities within the scope of their 
responsibilities and remit, such as labour inspection agencies or environmental protection 
agencies’.80  Reference is also made to the importance of transparency in the subcontracting 
chain but here the emphasis is specifically on the presence of employees within a domestic 
context. 
 
Whilst these measures lack some detail they do go further than the 2004 Directive in 
placing a positive expectation on the member states to enable labour standards such as 
applicable ILO standards to be respected including by subcontractors. The measures of a 
Directive are addressed to the member states and primarily require action by the member states 
rather than public buyers. There is therefore the matter of implementation to consider before 
assessing the full outcome of the new provisions. Nevertheless, the measures in the new 
Directive appear clearly to envisage the incorporation of social criteria in contract performance 
conditions including those related to workers’ rights and working conditions and more 
explicitly recognise the link between subcontracting (and therefore supply chains) and social 
and employment standards. 
 
Overall, the new Directive has clearly taken up the challenge of incorporating social 
considerations into the public procurement regime. The specific scope for acting on this basis 
is sometimes less clear. Concerning technical specifications the options are still relatively 
restrictive. A number of changes have been made to the provisions on award criteria and the 
opportunity to incorporate social considerations has increased though it is not clear how supply 
chain matters may fall within this category. References to contract performance conditions 
may have gone further through direct reference to the need for compliance with listed 
international instruments including by subcontractors. One important limitation with the 
changes as a whole, with regards to the challenges of the electronics industry supply chain, is 
that, significant though the references to ILO standards are, these will currently only go part 
of the way to addressing problems in the  chain. Some issues, such as freedom of association, 
collective bargaining and combating child labour, fall within the scope of Annex X, 
incorporating as it does the fundamental ILO Conventions. But others, such as payment of a 
'living wage' and protection against excessive working hours, do not. In addition, although 
vague or widely framed wording allows for interpretation of the rules on social criteria, the 
European Commission has issued guidance which seems to emphasise that the social 
provisions are intended to pursue internal EU or member state objectives and/or where there 
is a clear link with the product or service (the subject matter condition) or the initial location 
of the contract and cannot be used as a general basis to require social responsibility.81   
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On the basis of the above analysis, the greatest remit for inclusion of terms affecting 
the supply chain lies in the contract performance stage. The imposition of performance 
conditions was previously (under the 2004 Directive) the most permissive of the procurement 
process and this does not appear to have been substantively altered for present purposes. 
References to the use of subcontractors, although again limited, and the general social 
considerations in Art 18, provide the least restrictive references to social criteria. Also, as 
mentioned, the imposition of contract performance conditions does not interfere with the 
evaluation of tenders and so is  less likely to fall foul of rules on non-discrimination giving 
public buyers more freedom to incorporate such conditions.  
 
3. Using contract performance conditions to improve workers’ rights  in the electronics 
supply chain  
 
3.1 Approaches to the use of contract performance conditions 
 
Although the incoming EU Directive does include more references to social criteria 
than its predecessor limitations clearly remain. Particular challenges posed by the supply chain, 
including the electronics supply chain, comprise  the need for conditions to have extraterritorial 
reach; this is, to apply to countries along the supply chain, many of which are not EU member 
states. Conditions would also need to apply in the context of complex supply chain 
relationships in which there may be many parties and where the factories involved in that chain 
are often not in a contractual relationship with the public buyer and in some cases also not the 
contracting supplier.  Equally, as businesses in the supply chain operate in multiple 
jurisdictions legal standards establishing protection for workers vary and may not be entirely 
clear for all those involved in the chain. Therefore, the practical means by which these supply 
chain issues can be tackled in the procurement process is far from clear. As discussed, the best 
opportunity to incorporate human rights and social considerations in the procurement process 
appears to be through the use of contract performance conditions. However, even in this phase 
of the procurement process applying contractual conditions to improve supply chain conditions 
is not straightforward. At a general level, difficulties arise because the public buyer is not in a 
contractual relationship with the subcontractors along the chain. Whilst the public buyer may 
agree conditions with the contracting supplier, without additional efforts the buyer has no role 
in ensuring that the desired conditions are adopted by the supplier in their contracts with 
subcontractors. A public buyer cannot impose requirements on parties with whom it is not in 
a contractual relationship and nor is it in a position to enforce or monitor conditions further 
along the supply chain. The effective use of contract performance conditions consequently will 
rely on finding ways of overcoming these limitations and ensuring that the desired standards 
or outcomes are incorporated along the chain. Consideration in the literature is, however, 
limited with regard to the ways in which contract performance conditions could in fact be used 
to achieve responsible supply chain objectives and what those conditions might be. This 
section seeks to further the analysis in this area by considering options for the use of specific 
contract performance conditions based on two different approaches (i) the use of contract terms 
throughout the supply chain and (ii) a due diligence approach which places emphasis on the 
role of the contracting supplier.  
 
3.1.1 Cascading contracts  
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The first approach is that the public buyer could seek to use the procurement process 
to influence the whole supply chain through the use of 'cascading' contract performance clauses 
in which suppliers at each level assume responsibilities with regard to working conditions and 
workers’ rights , monitoring and supervision of the supplier with whom they are in a direct 
contractual relationship. This passes a chain of contract performance conditions regarding 
workers’ rights and working conditions down the supply chain. 
In this approach, the contract between the public buyer and the contracting supplier 
includes a clause requiring specified conditions to be written into the contracts at every level 
of the supply chain. In this way the buyer will have determined the conditions to be met by 
subcontractors further down the chain even though they are not in a contractual relationship 
with those subcontractors. Each party down the chain would be obliged to ensure that it only 
entered into contracts with sub-contractors who also agreed to incorporate those conditions, 
and so on down the chain.  Failure to ensure that the agreed contract performance criteria were 
passed on would ultimately result in a failure of the contractor to fulfil their own contract.  
 
This approach is initially attractive insofar as it provides a legal, contractual basis for 
the adoption of desired standards at all levels of the supply chain and at the same time works 
around the problems of an absence of direct legal relationships between the public buyer and 
suppliers further along the chain and of the public buyer otherwise having to assume an 
undesirable and disproportionate degree of responsibility for failures by those suppliers.  
 
There are however a number of difficulties with the approach. First, many contracting  
suppliers and secondary suppliers will already have long-term supply contracts in place and 
any such clauses would therefore require them to renegotiate a vast number of existing 
contracts. This would be problematic and impractical because of the need to vary the contracts 
all the way down the supply chain. In addition, because of the separate nature of the contracts 
at each stage it would be difficult to check that implementation, in the sense of adoption of the 
specific clauses throughout the chain, has been achieved all the way through the supply chain. 
Enforcement and monitoring would in turn be extremely difficult. In any case, in this approach 
the public buyer is still not in a contractual relationship with subcontractors down the supply 
chain and can only take action against the contracting supplier at the very top of the chain. The 
public buyer is not a party to the subsequent contracts and a failure to adopt the specific clauses 
by parties along the supply chain cannot be enforced by the contracting authority. Although 
there may be a failure by the contracting supplier to meet the contract conditions (difficulties 
with implementation and monitoring aside) the impact of this can only extend to action against 
that supplier and does not enable the public buyer to take or require direct action to remedy the 
problem that has actually arisen, for example with working conditions, at another point in the 
supply chain.  Therefore, while possible theoretically, this approach might lack the 
enforceability and practicability necessary to achieve the desired change in standards and 
conditions.  
 
3.1.2 Contracting supplier responsibility and supply chain due diligence 
 
A second, alternative, approach would aim to make the contracting supplier (the one 
the public buyer has a direct legal relationship with through the procurement contract) assume 
the main responsibility for ultimately transforming working conditions in the supply chain.  
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The first way that this could be achieved is by establishing explicit legal obligations 
on the supplier to ensure that specified conditions are met by all of the subcontractors in the 
chain to ensure respect for human rights in their factories (for instance concerning working 
conditions). This imposes significant, and inflexible, obligations on the supplier since a failure 
for these obligations to be applied at any point along the supply chain will result in the 
contracting supplier being in breach of its contract with the public buyer.  It would also be very 
onerous for the public buyer who would need to follow up on the obligations along the supply 
chain in order to determine compliance by the contracting supplier.  It is unlikely that any 
supplier would be prepared to contract with a public buyer on the basis that they would be in 
breach of that contract for violations of working conditions by sub-contracted manufacturers 
further down the supply chain. Although a strictly legalistic option has the benefit of certainty, 
a more flexible strategy may be preferable in terms of both the burden imposed on the parties 
and in achieving the desired outcomes.  
 
The second way that a contracting supplier could be made responsible under a 
procurement contract is that the supplier assumes an obligation to exercise due diligence over 
its supply chain rather than assuming liability for ensuring that strict outcomes are achieved at 
levels of the chain. This might overcome the difficulties with the strictly formal, legalistic 
approach. A due diligence approach would be consistent with current international 
developments regarding management of supply chains and relations between business partners 
and subcontractors. In the last decade corporate due diligence has emerged as the main measure 
of the responsibility of businesses with regard to their impact in human rights.82  The UN 
Special Representative favoured due diligence in its 2008 report establishing the Framework 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” 83  and it is currently the cornerstone of the so called 
“responsibility to respect” developed in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights. 84  The Guiding Principles identify the responsibilities of business enterprises as 
including 'a due-diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they 
address their impact on human rights.'85 In the sphere of human rights, businesses are expected 
to 'base their activities on the exercise of due diligence and have in place the processes and 
mechanisms to track, monitor and respond to any negative human rights impact their activities 
create'. 86Equally, the revised 2011 OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises give a 
prominent role to corporate due diligence when defining business responsibility to respect 
human rights.87 Whilst the UN Guiding Principles include the need for business to engage in 
remediation processes for victims of human rights abuses as part of their due diligence, other 
instruments, including the OECD Guidelines, have been more timid.88 The corporate human 
rights due diligence approach therefore assumes an active role on the part of businesses in 
identifying, preventing and mitigating, and on some occasions remediating, their impacts on 
human rights. 
 
A due diligence  approach is currently being demanded of business in different spheres 
and, particularly for the regulation of supply chains. Perhaps the most prominent development 
has been Section 1502 of the US Dodd Frank Act.89   Recognising the link between the 
exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and the conflict in that region including extreme levels of violence, particularly sexual and 
gender-based violence, the Act establishes requirements for disclosure and reporting including 
the adoption of appropriate due diligence measures. The requirements apply to companies 
which use specific metals (tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold) for the manufacture of their 
products. Under section 1502 businesses are required to report on the measures taken to 
17 
exercise due diligence 'on the source and chain of custody of such minerals' in order to avoid 
the financing of illegal armed groups through their commercial activities. Section 1502 is 
widely understood to have transformed the approach towards raw materials in the minerals 
supply chain. In addition, the impact of Section 1502 has accelerated intergovernmental 
responses to this problem, in the framework of the OECD and the Intergovernmental 
Conference of the Great Lakes Region.90  The approach adopted in this piece of legislation 
reflects the responsibilities established in the Guiding Principles and requires the company to 
take an active role in understanding the source of their minerals, performing due diligence and 
making disclosures. The standard of corporate due diligence with regard to human rights 
adopted for the implementation of Section 1502, and other national and intergovernmental 
initiatives dealing with conflict minerals, has been the one defined by the OECD in its Due 
Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and 
High-Risk Areas. This document envisages that in exercising due diligence businesses entities 
will identify and assess the factual circumstances of their mineral extraction and the associated 
human rights and conflict risks and will take steps to prevent or mitigate harm, monitor such 
efforts and report on them.91   
 
Although not expressly referring to due diligence, the California Transparency and 
Supply Chain Act imposes similar requirements and responsibilities. The Act requires retail 
sellers and manufacturers (whose gross annual worldwide income exceeds one hundred million 
dollars) to disclose their efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their direct 
supply chains.92  The disclosure requirement compels the retail sellers and manufacturers to: 
evaluate risks of human trafficking and slavery in their supply chain; address such risks, audit 
its suppliers to assess their compliance with company standards for trafficking and slavery in 
supply chains; require direct suppliers to certify that materials incorporated into their products 
comply with local laws regarding slavery and human trafficking; maintain internal 
accountability standards and procedures for employees or contractors failing to meet such  
standards, and finally; provide training on human trafficking and slavery, particularly on how 
to mitigate risks, to company employees and management with direct responsibility for supply 
chain management.93  Retail sellers and manufactures need to specify whether the verification 
was concluded by independent third parties and whether audits were unannounced. Similarly 
to the Dodd-Frank provision, the Act requires that this information is made publicly available 
on the company website, which makes companies, potentially, more socially accountable.94   
 
Returning to public procurement and the electronics industry supply chain, in this 
context the contracting supplier would be required by the public buyer in the contract 
performance conditions to exercise due diligence. The contracting supplier would need to take 
the necessary steps to identify its own supply chain, and monitor it. It should adopt the 
necessary measures to avoid abusive labour relationships and practices inconsistent with 
agreed rights and working conditions. Among the responsibilities of the contracting suppliers 
would also be independently auditing progress and supply chain conditions and reporting 
measures taken to comply with the agreed standards and  potentially engage in remediation 
when conditions have been violated This due diligence  approach clearly imposes a substantial 
duty on the contracting supplier but potentially provides for mitigation and improvement on a 
responsive basis rather than depending on 'all or nothing' compliance. For the public buyer it 
potentially addresses some of the difficulties arising from the chain of contracts and lack of 
direct legal relations between the various parties along the chain whilst still providing a means 
to require that agreed conditions and rights are respected.  
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3.2. Building human rights and social considerations into contract performance 
conditions  
 
 
3.2.1 Supply chain disclosure: Suppliers and factory locations  
 
An essential starting point for the incorporation to minimum standards for the protection of 
workers’ rights is to achieve transparency of the supply chain. Only by understanding the 
supply chain and identifying the factories involved in the manufacturing process can 
knowledge of the working conditions in those factories involved surface. In a simple contract 
between a public buyer and a supplier there is no legal requirement for the identification of the 
sub-contractors which the contractor will use in order to deliver the contracted goods and by 
extension there is no way to identify where such goods will be manufactured. This gap in 
information consequently is a significant, initial block to ensuring that workers’ rights are 
respected throughout the supply chain. The identification and disclosure of these 
subcontractors could therefore be an important condition to impose on the contracting supplier. 
 
One means of achieving the required disclosure would be to introduce a requirement 
which would cascade through the chain of contracts, in other words each supplier would 
identify its own suppliers to the respective purchasers up the chain and would pass down that 
same requirement to its own subcontractors. In and of itself this incorporation of a disclosure 
requirement into contracts is a relatively simple approach, which is unlikely to be particularly 
onerous at any stage of the supply chain. An obstacle to the approach though is that many 
contracted suppliers and secondary suppliers will already have long-term supply contracts in 
place. As noted above, renegotiating and varying the terms in a large number of contracts is 
problematic. Issues of confidentiality may also arise in certain contracts. In addition, 
verification would be complex; because of the separate nature of the contracts at each stage it 
would be difficult to check that implementation, in the sense of adoption of the disclosure 
requirement and the necessary means to comply with it, has been achieved all the way through 
the supply chain.  
 
Alternatively, a due diligence approach could see the contracting supplier assume 
responsibility for the disclosure of all subcontractors to the public buyer. Here, the public buyer 
would include in the contract a requirement that the contracting supplier exercises supply chain 
due diligence, this is, takes all the appropriate measures to trace the supply chain and provide 
information on all of the subcontractors and factories that form part of the supply chain for the 
contracted goods. The contracting supplier would assume a responsibility, derived from the 
contract performance conditions, to work with its contractors and subcontractors to find out 
the location of all factories in the supply chain and then to disclose these details to the public 
buyer. 
 
This approach would not only simplify the identification process, ensuring that all 
factories and suppliers were disclosed at a single point, but would also increase the visibility 
of the whole supply chain to the public buyer since all subcontractors and manufacturers would 
be identified directly to them. Although the simplicity of this exercise would benefit the public 
buyer by reducing the difficulties with ensuring implementation associated with multiple 
contracts, it would clearly involve a significant undertaking on the part of the supplier. 
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Compiling the information would be an expensive, technical and time consuming task for the 
supplier, which would increase the cost of doing business with a public buyer. External 
expertise, for instance in the form of a supply-chain due diligence consultancy, may be needed. 
In light of this, such a requirement is likely to be met with a degree of resistance.95  If adopted 
however, there would be an incentive for suppliers to adopt disclosure requirements in their 
own contracts which would then reduce the burden over time, as contracts are signed or 
renewed, and would ensure that the obligation becomes built in along the supply chain. 
 
3.2.2 Workers’ rights and labour standards   
 
Having provided for disclosure of the supply chain it is necessary to consider the 
workers’ rights and labour standards  that would be expected within the identified factories. 
This involves choices about what the standards are and how, or by whom, those standards are 
determined. In this respect the choice of approach (through clauses in every contract or via due 
diligence of the contracting supplier) has less relevance than for other aspects of the model 
because the agreed standards can in theory be adopted in either approach.  
 
In determining what the appropriate labour standards should be, one option is to start 
with the problem itself, for instance, lead times for the delivery of goods that are too short or 
wages that are too low. In this case an agreement might include requirements for 'reasonable' 
or 'fair' lead times and pay. This approach is problematic from the point of view of contractual 
relations and enforcement. Because terms such as 'reasonable lead times' or 'fair wages' are 
wide and imprecise it is unlikely that contracting parties would be willing to sign contracts in 
which they were used and even if they were willing, such terms might invite problems and 
litigation where parties disagreed as to their meaning. A preferable approach is to address the 
working conditions upon which the problems rest, for instance by determining requirements 
for minimum wages, maximum working hours, and security of employment contracts. Such 
terms are preferable from a contractual point of view because they are precise which means 
that parties are more likely to be willing to agree to their inclusion and that they are also more 
easily enforceable.  
 
As to the specific labour standards to be applied, one means of determining these is by 
reference to existing external standards. A logical point of reference is the concept of decent 
work developed by the ILO.96  A reference to these will have the advantages of clarity and a 
strong grounding in international standards. Reference to international social standards is, as 
discussed, also made in the EU Directives, including to the core ILO Conventions, giving 
further weight to their use. As discussed one limitation is that the ILO Conventions do not 
address all factors relevant to problems in the electronics supply chain. If the buyer wishes to 
address additional concerns associated with the electronics supply chain it may be necessary 
to supplement these for instance with reference to minimum wages. 
 
Another option would be to have the standards determined by an external organisation. 
This approach has been adopted in initiatives in other sectors. The Workers’ Rights 
Consortium (WRC) for instance, works with university and college members to improve 
conditions for workers in the apparel supply chain. The model is based on adoption of a Code 
of Conduct by affiliate members that sets out expectations of members including standards to 
be required of their suppliers.97  Likewise, the Fair Labor Association (FLA) works with 
affiliated companies who agree to adopt FLA’s Workplace Code of Conduct.98 This option 
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would require the contracting supplier to agree to ensure that all of its subcontractors allow the 
independent organisation access to their factories for the purpose of monitoring (see below). 
Full, clear details as to what standards would be expected would necessarily have to be 
established in advance of the supplier and subcontractors agreeing to adopt this condition, as 
they are unlikely to agree to conditional clauses or requirements which would leave the 
determination of responsibilities and duties vague.  
 
3.2.3 Monitoring conditions and gaining access to the factories 
   
Ensuring that agreed labour standards are being adhered to within the supply chain 
requires independent monitoring systems, which in turn is only possible if there are provisions 
for accessing the site and factories involved for the purpose of such verification or monitoring. 
The main issue is which party assumes the responsibility for such monitoring. A public buyer 
is highly unlikely to have the resources to undertake this role even if it did have a willingness 
to take on this burden. Equally, the contracting supplier may not have the means or willingness 
to undertake such monitoring, and leaving it to each contractor raises questions of 
independence. This is where independent organisations acting in a monitoring or auditing role 
have a role to play. Organisations acting in this role exist in other industries. The WRC, for 
instance, carries out investigations of factories producing apparel for sale in the USA and 
Canada, makes recommendations for remediation in the event that violations are identified and 
works with US apparel companies to encourage implementation of those recommendations. 
Similarly, FLA carries out monitoring and assessments to determine compliance and makes 
recommendations where problems are identified.99  The Sweatfree Purchasing Consortium 
referred to above is also based on the involvement of an independent monitoring body. 
Independent monitoring to verify conditions in the supply chain is also the model adopted by 
Electronics Watch, who plans to work alongside workers and local civil-society organisations 
in these investigations.100 
 
The main issue with regard to using independent monitoring organisations to verify 
the compliance with the agreed labour standards in the supply chain is how to legally compel 
the members of the chain to engage with such monitoring schemes and provide access to their 
factories. Within an ordinary contract between the buyer and supplier introducing a monitoring 
mechanism is again problematic because the buyer is not in a contractual relationship with the 
subcontractors down the supply chain and therefore cannot enforce the requirement for access. 
A condition that access by an independent monitoring organisation be included in its own 
contracts could be applied to the supplier but again, depending on the supply chain, some 
subcontractors might not be in a contractual relationship with the supplier. 
  
In the cascading contractual clauses approach, every contract would have to include a 
monitoring clause demanding each subcontractor to join the monitoring scheme and have a 
direct relationship with the monitoring organisation. This approach is problematic because the 
public buyer would be reliant on the supplier or subcontractor enforcing the conditions in their 
own contract; the buyer will not have a clear means of ensuring that the requirement for access 
has been adopted. 
 
A supplier due diligence approach might offer the more pragmatic solution. In this 
approach the supplier, taking action to prevent or mitigate abuses of working conditions in its 
supply chain, would assume responsibility for ensuring that all the companies in its supply 
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chain agree to allow access by an independent monitoring organisation. This responsibility 
would be identified in the contract performance conditions but, in line with the due diligence 
approach, decisions as to how it is achieved would be made by the contracting supplier. A 
supplier might, for instance, decide to incorporate this responsibility contractually, 
incorporating the requirement into its contracts with sub-contractors and manufacturers as they 
are signed or renewed. Alternatively a less formal approach (i.e. one based on voluntary 
agreements) might be pursued. The contract performance conditions could potentially 
incorporate a requirement that the contracting supplier regularly report on the action it has 
taken to discharge these responsibilities.  
 
Again a large degree of responsibility here lies with the contracting supplier rather 
than the public buyer but it does provide an opportunity for the buyer to ensure that the all 
relevant levels of the supply chain adopt the requirement for access and monitoring. Although 
this arrangement is burdensome for the supplier in some respects it could also be the case that 
once a supply chain for a product has been fully reported on and subject to monitoring or 
auditing this would be an asset to the supplier, since the product would then be more attractive 
to public sector bodies who are seeking assurances about workers’  rights and social 
responsibility in the supply chain.  
 
3.2.4 Remediation, penalties and sanctions 
 
The options discussed above assume a model in which the public buyer adopts contract 
performance conditions with the aim of ensuring that the electronic goods that it is procuring 
come from a supply chain in which workers’  rights  are respected. An important consideration 
in this process is the consequences that should flow in the event of non-compliance by any of 
the parties.  
 
In earlier stages of the process outlined above the contracting supplier has taken steps 
to identify and prevent human rights violations or poor working conditions by understanding 
and disclosing the supply chain and introducing an independent monitoring process through 
that chain. In line with its further responsibility to mitigate or redress harm the contracting 
supplier should also be required to act when non-compliance and supply chain problems are 
identified. Where an independent organisation performs a role in monitoring supply chain 
factories it is logical that they would report violations of the determined standards to the 
supplier. The terms and definitions of these violations would need to be clearly specified. The 
contracting supplier would then assume responsibility for acting in response to violations.  
 
In line with the most demanding approach to corporate due diligence (as defined by 
the UN Guiding Principles) mechanisms for remediation will be needed. Such mechanisms 
should ideally provide a means by which all relevant parties (including supply chain 
employees, sub-contractors, the contracting supplier, and the public buyer) can raise issues and 
seek resolution and remedies. These remediation processes may be mediated by independent 
monitoring organisations or directly managed by the contracting supplier as long as they 
provide the necessary assurance of independence. Whether deriving from a remediation 
process or not sanctions and penalties for non-compliance with the required working 
conditions will need to be defined. The choice of sanction or penalty may depend on factors 
such as the degree or persistence of the violation and the desired outcome (for instance whether 
the sanction seeks to encourage compliance or create a deterrent effect). Sanctions such as 
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termination of a contract or blacklisting may have an immediate effect in enabling the supplier 
to work with a new subcontractor and acting as a strong deterrent but may also heavily penalise 
workers at the factory (for example though unemployment) and might not lead to improved 
standards particularly where the factory is producing goods or components under contract to 
other suppliers and can continue to operate on that basis. In some situations a more cooperative 
approach based on working with the monitoring organisation to remedy and raise standards, 
within an agreed framework, might be preferable if there is a reluctance to penalise the factory 
owners and their employees.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Ensuring that adequate human rights and labour standards are respected in the 
electronics supply chain is a pressing concern because of the significant size of the sector and 
its manufacturing operations and the implications of failings in this chain, as highlighted by 
the recent scandals described in the introduction. . Public buyers are significant consumers of 
electronic products and thus public procurement is a potentially powerful tool to create demand 
for improved supply chain conditions. However, to date the full potential has been exploited 
only in very limited circumstances. Our analysis of the incoming EU Directive suggests that 
the potential to address supply chain issues, as social criteria, appears expanded but remains 
limited. Although the new Directive aimed, among other things, to clarify the scope for 
inclusion of social criteria in public procurement, it falls short of introducing a clear and broad 
opportunity to do so. Particular obstacles include a lack of clarity of the interpretation of the 
subject-matter requirement and the need to pursue the most economically advantageous tender. 
To the extent that social considerations are referred to the emphasis - as with earlier attempts 
to pursue 'horizontal policies' - appears to lie with domestic concerns and not with 
extraterritorial, supply chain matters.  
 
Within the sometimes unclear and limited framework of the EU legal regime for public 
procurement the stage in which contract performance conditions are being included in the 
procurement contract (rather than in the technical specifications or award criteria) provides the 
greatest opportunity to influence supply chain conditions. This article has therefore considered 
how contract performance considerations could be employed by public buyers to address 
workers’ rights  in the electronics supply chain. An approach based on cascading contract 
terms, adopted and demanded at each level of the supply chain, provides for certainty and can 
be enforced in the same way as any other contract terms. This approach though is impractical 
to incorporate and is likely to act as a disincentive to potential contractors and sub-contractors. 
Alternatively an approach based around principles of corporate due diligence could provide a 
more pragmatic and responsive strategy, ultimately leading to greater improvements in the 
supply chain. In discussing how social considerations - specifically labour rights - could be 
incorporated into contract performance, we focused on the means by which the supply chain 
could be identified, standards determined and improvements or failings identified, recognised 
and responded to. Certainly, whilst the drive to improve standards can come from the public 
buyer it is unrealistic to assume that these buyers would take on responsibility for establishing 
standards and carrying out activities to monitor compliance along the supply chain. At the 
same time it may also be very onerous on the contracting supplier to undertake compliance 
monitoring throughout its supply chain. A model based on working with an independent 
monitoring organisation could address this outstanding need and has been seen in other models 
such as the Sweatfree Purchasing Consortium.  
23 
 
The EU rules potentially provide some legal scope to pursue improved working 
conditions in the electronics industry through public procurement. Exploiting this potential 
will require demand from public buyers as well as a willingness on the part of contractors and 
supply chain companies to work collaboratively and assume greater responsibility. While 
challenging, the burden on each party would be significantly reduced over time, as 
requirements become established. Incorporating this approach might then be beneficial to 
contractors (and their sub-contractors down the chain) seeking to tender for the supply of 
electronic goods to public buyers. Clearly, utilising the potential of public procurement 
depends to an extent on taxpayer support for public funds to be spent in socially responsible 
ways, and thus public awareness is likely also to be crucial to implementation. However, 
working with options to incorporate transparency, human rights, labour standards, and 
independent monitoring there are limited but specific opportunities within the legal framework 
for public procurement for public buyers to seek to improve working conditions in the 
electronics supply chain by leveraging their buying power. 
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